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An Introduction to
the Hermeneutics of
Luigi Pareyson

Peter Carravetta

La vera interpretazioneequellache si
consegueai limiti de/la
comprensibilita
.-L. Pareyson
1. PREMISES

This introductory critical assessment of Luigi Pareyson' s
thought, being part of a larger project, 1 is to be understood bearing
the following three perspectives in mind. First, within the horizon
of the theory-method relation. Second, in terms of a referential
hermeneutic yardstick which will serve as an external, "empirical
control," or better yet, a screen upon which to trace the movements
of about ten conditions to be met. And third, in view of a still-inprogress idea of interpretation as diaphoristics.
Concerning the first parameter, we are provisionally going
to assume that interpretation is constituted and activated by a
grounding dialectic between the requirements of epistemology,
which underlie and legitimate methodic process, and those of
ontology, which are inherent in theory. Otherwise stated, one
cannot use or apply a critical method without at the same time
positing a referential ontology, whether explicitly or tacitly; vice
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versa, one cannot theorize about any object or phenomenon, be
it Picasso's Guernica,the university system or Kafka's texts, without resorting to certain systematic, organizational "moves," in
other words, without doing it methodically. This will explain, I
hope, my emphasis on specific key terms and tenets of Pareyson's
thought, instead of others which, though important enough to
warrant other perspectives, need not occupy us here. 2
The second parameter for our reading is constituted by certain
more or less established principles of hermeneutics as derived
primarily from the tradition that leads into, and is systematized
by, the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer. A makeshift compendium
of Gadamer's thought-which
is at the same time sensitive to the
conceptual innovations brought about by Schleiermacher, Hegel,
Dilthey, Husserl and Heidegger 3-would give us the following
decalogue:
is, intrinsically, historical,linguistic, dialectic,ontological, the event of being, objective,begins with the text, exists within the
present of the interpreter,is a disclosingof truth, and, finally, interpretation is the locuswhere the aesthetichas beenabsorbedby or transformed
into the genuinely hermeneutic.4
Interpretation

The specific range and depth of each of these terms will become
evident through this reading and in the conclusions.
The critical metaphor of the Diaphoraderives from another
context, one in which poetry and philosophy are not conceived
as being in opposition to each other, or in radical, mutually exclusive antithesis, but, rather, as necessarily co-originary and thus
constantly con-versing. The interpretation of the text comes into
existence when it enters this field, initiating a dialogue with several
voices, a mise-en-scene which might be, but does not have to be a
mise-en-abyme, a speaking, we might say, with several possible
differentiated characters. 5
2. AESTHETICS

First published in 1954 after studies on existentialism, Jaspers
and German idealism, 6 Luigi Pareyson's Estetica: teoria della formativita is the third and last (after Croce's and Gentile's) of the
great books on aesthetics written in this century in Italy, coming
out at a time when this genre seemed to have outlived its reason
to be.7 The importance of this work rests on its being the first, at
least in the Italian panorama, to deal with the beingof the interpreter
and the beingof art, setting them in relation by means of interpre-
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tation itself, and describing the process in ontological terms. The
key term in Pareyson is Formain its dynamic, interacting sense.
As such Forma is, at any one time, either forma formante-form as
an enabling process which gives a specific shape to whatever it
is dealing with-or
forma formata-form as what something
exhibits when at rest, what makes it recognizable as such.
Pareyson anchors his vision in the heart of human existence,
believing that humankind in its broadest sense is essentially a
producer of forms (Estetica19-23 et passim). Thus Forma exists" as
an organism living of its own life and inner legitimation, closed
and open both within the definiteness that encloses the infinite"

[comeorganismovivente di propriavita e legalita interna, conclusaed
aperta insieme nella sua definitezza che racchiudel'infinito].
From these premises, art is described by means of a
phenomenology of its realization or "coming into being" [nel suo
farsi]. Here we discover that art is both productionand invention,
which means that in effect art is a making which invents its own
manner or way of doing, realizing itself as a series of attempts
toward a successful or fulfilled completion [tentativi verso la riuscita]. One cannot produce art without inventing the means to
"make" it, but, by the same token, one does not invent anything
unless it is also produced, made real. The underlying principle is
called forming-activity [formativita, literally 'formativity'], 8 which
assumes a content, a material means and an inner working law
peculiar and specific to it (E 22-27). Among the preliminary findings of this position is that, above all, art is conscious of and
respects the alterity of the work, "protecting" it so to speak from
blind insight or misguided appropriation. Later, the same concern
with alterity will mark interpretation in general.
3. ART

If, as Pareyson holds, art is a forming-activity both specific
and intentional, then the question arises: How do we distinguish
it from the rest of experience, if our entire existence is dependent
upon this forming capacity?
First point: Art has no pre-establishedend-that is, it is not a
forming-activity-of anything in particular, but form which aims at
becoming Form, and that's all. Notice how this sounds very much
like what was postulated by such diverse and indeed strange
bedfellows as Benedetto Croce and Gertrude Stein. But this ought
not to be seen as a contradiction or inconsistency as much as the
fullest exploitation of what both the Idealistic tradition and the
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Idealism of all theorizing done by artists in general have yielded
as unshakable premises of cultural humankind: every person is
an idealist at one time or another; moreover, let's not forget that
idealist/idealism contains the root notion of idea, eidos, vision.
However, we will also see radical divergencies among these positions once we explore other aspects. For instance, Pareyson says
that thinking and ethics, though subordinated to the "formation
principle," interact with it, so that the forming-activity [formativita]
is directed at a given action or phenomenon by taking into consideration thought-i.e.,
that which thought has formulated-while
at the same time respecting its alterity. This argument rests on
the fundamental ontology of the persona, or person, which in
Pareyson embodies the opening or disclosedness as the coincidence of self-relation and hetero-relation. Person, in short, can
be thought of as the recognition of alterity, and is therefore eminently social, interpersonal. It can be seen that the argument is
pointing toward a dialogics of sorts. But to defer this discussion,
it should also be clear that art may-it doesn't have to-incorporate
the contribution of thought (of ethics, ideology, politics), without
sacrificing its primary ideal, which is to become Form. 9 This will
be crucial to criticism, as we will see further down.
On the other hand, even in terms of action guided by what
sounds like a very pragmatic telos-whether
it regards shaping
an idea, or a simple constructive gesture, or even just going
through the rituals of everydayness handed down through history-people always try to do things "aesthetically." In the original
Italian, Pareyson relies on the idiomatic expression fare le case ad
arte, literally "to make things as if they were a work of art," better
yet, "to do it right," or according to the inner necessity to do
things well, perfectly and beautifully. In art there's a shapingactivity which seeks the Forming process itself : though each and
every human action is forming-activity [formativita],the work qua
work of art is Formation [formazione],"in the sense that the work
intentionally aims at Formation, and thought and action intervene
only in order to insure that it reaches it" (E 23).
The work of art is also intrinsically matter/substance, in Italian
materia, a concrete entity that denies the genitive to art insofar as
it must evidence itself as pure form. As such, the material aspect
of the work sets up a polarity with respect to the shaping principle
of the artistic process, which is identified as puro tentare, pure
groping and attempting. 10 This calls to mind another vector, the
pull of interpretive dynamics, the seeking of a path guided by a
Form which is not yet there (and is, therefore, unknown, ungraspable, invisible so to speak) and must, therefore, be guessed or
divined:
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The divination of form is thus only a law guiding the execution in
progress, a law that cannot be explicated in terms of precepts, but
rather, as an inner norm of the action aiming at its successful
completion [alla riuscita]; thus it is not a single law valid for all
artistic cases, but a rule which is immanent to the one specific
process in question. (E 75)

For Pareyson this is consistent with the traditional notion of art
as a making, admitting both techneand poiein, as well as with the
more (historically) recent idea of lo stile e l'uomo, Buffon's "the
style is the man," a very fortunate ideologeme crucial to the understanding of Modern, especially post-Romantic, aesthetics. In
fact, in Pareyson's universe one finds Goethe, Poe, Schelling,
Fichte, Bergson, Valery, Dewey.11 It is worth remarking on how
Pareyson interprets Kant's aesthetics of disinterested and detached contemplation. Pareyson "extracts" from the "Analytic of
the Sublime" materials to integrate into his notion of person:
The sublime is therefore the only instance, in Kant's aesthetics, of
an aesthetic judgment which is truly and properly expression of a
feeling [sentimento], in the sense that it offers to this feeling a sensible
figuration. It is a contemplation which is expression, that is, not
only recognition, but an active attribution of spiritual senses: it is
the transfiguration of reality as figuration of a feeling [sentimento].
(EK 135)

Further down, the very description/interpretation
of the sublime
is predisposed to an existential, dialogic, inter-personaldynamics:
If the beautiful is the object of a judgment of taste, the sublime
"comes from a spiritual sentiment"; if the beautiful concerns a
relationship between subject and object in which the active role is
played somehow by the latter, in predisposing itself to the exigencies of the former, the sublime instead concerns the relationship
of subject and object in which the active role is played by the
subject, which transfers unto the object its inner feeling [interno
sentimento].If the contemplation of the beautiful is a calm recognizing, the contemplation of the sublime is an emotionally charged
attributing of spiritual meanings to nature [la contemplazionedel

sublime e un commossorivestire di sensi spirituali la natura]. (EK 136)

In either case it can be seen how his theory of art is at once
antithetical to Kant's, as we saw above when he states that art
has no purpose, and yet a "development" of some deeply buried
premises of the Third Critique. Contrary to what Gadamer does,
which is to cdtique the aesthetic consciousness as a sort of aliena-
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tion, as "differentiation" with respect to reality and finally for its
abstract dogmatism which prevented the understanding of art as
also (if not primarily) "a mode of self-understanding" (Truth and
Method 86), Pareyson retrieves the "conscious act" of the experience of the sublime and the beautiful and underscores the founding necessary aspect which is related to the forming activity of
the person: receptivity, in short, is an activity, and insofar as it
is a doing, it is poiein, it is a producer of forms, of discourse we
might say. Ergo the aesthetic experience is intrinsically related to
the interpretive one, which is characterized as dialectic-productive.12 His aesthetic is finally anchored to the three notions of
Production, Interaction, and Forming-activity.
4. THE ONTOLOGY

If everything in life and, therefore, in understanding depends
upon this formative process, the notion of making, of fare, assumes
paramount relevance and must be examined closely. For the Italian
philosopher, any given action is the specification and the instancing of one activity which is at the same time the concentration of
all other possible activities. More than that, we form things by
"making" and by "inventing" the way things can be made:
l' artista deve fare cio che non esiste ancora, e quindi deve inventare
eseguendo,mentre il lettore deve coglierecio che esiste gia e quindi
deve eseguirericonoscendo.(E 249)
[The artist must make what does not yet exist, and must, therefore
invent while executing, whereas the reader must gather [also: grasp;
perceive] what exists already, therefore, executewhile recognizing.]

The proper evaluation both of the difference and the distinction between artist and reader has always been a problematical
point in interpretation theory. We must remember that, especially
in the wake of "committed" art (or art specifically intended for a
particular end, message or effect), the re-establishment of a boundary between art as totally free and preoccupied solely with Pure
Form, and reading (=criticism) as bound and committed to an
extra-aesthetic task, has basically given legitimacy to the epistemological approach to art and interpretation, and has indeed
contributed to that artistic "alienation" which characterizes the
Modern period. There are, however, several places in the Estetica
where from the point of view of understanding, there is no distinction between artist and critic, it being simply a question of position
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or emphasis: the artist will strive toward the realization of Pure
Form, the reader toward the comprehension of the same. Yet the
underlying ontology is the same, suggesting a difference of degree
rather than of kind. Nevertheless, to return to the text, we begin
to see, for instance, that the possibilities open to the work of art
are infinite because it rests upon what Pareyson in a later workVerita e Interpretazione,1972-calls the ontology of the inexhaustible

[ontologiadell'inesauribile]:
non il nulla, ma l' essere, non l' assenza ma la ridondanza
l' Abgrund ma l' Urgrund (VI 40)
[Not nothingness, but being, not absence but redundance
the Abgrund but the Urgrund]

...
...

non
not

This is an important consideration in light of the fact that
Pareyson' s thought is also typically interpreted, especially for its
more existentialist traits, as already on the way toward the postmetaphysical, in that it stresses the Abgrund (or the Un-grund) of
being in close connection with what he elsewhere terms the "ontology of freedom." Yet the very possibility of an ongoing (i.e.,
historical) thinking of being whose relationship to existence is
marked by endless revelations [rivelazioni]about a reality which,
no matter how defined, is "gratuitous" [gratuita],must speak the
language of events that have already taken place, what in other
philosophies are called monuments, tradition, the collective unconscious. This is an open door to the discourse on myth, the
arche and origin . The ontology is inexhaustible because the monuments, the traces, the memories are endless, because there has
always been an Urgrund. The constructions (the hypotheses, the
wars, the revolutions and the archives) which we cast and haul
about reality suspended between necessityand possibilitydo indeed
expose their weak side to a possible "anthropomorphism," 13 but
they also allow us to retrieve those forms which, though no longer
believed universal, did however embody an attempt or express a
will to some notion of universality or totality at various points in
our history. These are, have been, effectivehistory. As such, though
Pareyson has made an almost categorical distinction between
mythical and rational discourse, 14 what is here suggested is that
the notion of Urgrund does not have to be automatically read as
a teleological, absolute (perhaps "Hegelian") and foundational
gesture, because the telos here can be delimited, circumscribed,
localized and personalized,consistent with Pareyson's thoughts on
the experience of art, which, as we saw above, does yet have
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some sort of (no matter how "special") end, without having to
make claims for all Art. I think this disclosure, this openness in
Pareyson' s overall philosophy can be useful if we want to regain
an idea of history and of symbolic and figural signification which,
in the wake and under the influence of Heidegger, Derrida and
Benjamin, is not bound exclusively to the predominance of the
ontological difference or event, the trace or the monument.
Perhaps what is important to bear in mind is the problem of reality
and the responsibility of the single individual, issues which existentialism treated in depth but these days are too often dismissed
or simply forgotten. Man is always a person [persona],which leads
the philosopher to assert that no philosophy is plausible which is
not above all a "philosophy of the person," where both the subjective
and objective genitive obtain. The discourse thus far rests upon
these premises:
anzitutto il principio per cui ogni operare umano e sempre insieme
ricettivita e attivita, e in secondo luogo il principio per cui ogni operare
umano e sempre personale. (E 180)
[Above all [is] the principle according to which every human doing
is always both receptivity and activity, and secondly according to the
principle whereby every human doing is always personal. ]15

On the same page we read that:
Io devo si agire e decidere, ma anche non possonon decidere:v'e, nella
rnia liberta, nella liberta ch'io sono a me stesso, una necessita iniziale,
ch'e il segno del rnio esser principiato, del rnio lirnite, della rnia
finitezza, d'una ricettivita iniziale e costitutiva per cui io sono dato a
me stesso e la rnia iniziativa e data a se stessa. (ibid.)

[I must indeed act and decide, but also: I cannot not decide:there is,
in the freedom I have with respect to myself, an initial necessitywhich is the sign of my being principled, of my limits, and of my
finitude-a necessity for an initial and constitutive receptivity so that
I may be given over to myself and my initiative is given over to itself.]

In the same context the philosopher says in fact that "the form
itself of receptivity is an activity," though human making/doing
[operare] in not, initially, creative . To accept the dialectic of
stimulus-response does not mean subscribing to deterministic
passivity, but rather that the dyad receptivity-activity is always
active, connective and developing according to other intentional
premises.
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5. KNOWLEDGE AND INTERPRETATION

Perceptiveknowledge[conoscenzasensibile]can grasp reality only
insofar as it is marked by prefiguration, therefore, only insofar as
it can "produce and form" an image, "more to the point, an image
so well executed [riuscita]that it reveal, better, that it be the thing
itself" [un'immaginecosi ben riuscita che riveli anzi sia la cosastessa].
In other words, the intention to capture or penetrate the item in
question implies, solicits and even exacts the productivity which
will literally figure out the image.
As a result, human knowledge in general has an intrinsic
interpretive character. Interpretation, says the philosopher,
is a type of knowledge exquisitely active and personal: its active
nature explains its productive and formative character, and its personal nature explains how it is essentially movement, restlessness,
a search for syntony or resonance, in sum, endless figuration. (E
179-80; my emphasis)

One can see how at this particular juncture Pareyson's position
comes very close to some recent readings of both Freud and
Nietzsche as the thinkers of interminable analysis or interpretation. Moreover, coming from a totally different background, 16 by
underscoring figuration, his theory is proleptically in tune with
our postmodern hermeneutics. We will return to these considerations further down.
At this point we have established that interpretation is based
upon the person, which coincides with the knowing being, the
forming being, whereas the work (operain the Italian, not a minor
detail, suggesting process, temporality, indeed "working") is what
is known, what is already formed. Interpretation then is formante
or "forming," the work is formata or "formed." Said metaphorically, interpretation is "a seeing which lets itself be regarded, and
a regarding that aims at seeing ... a hearing which lets itself be
listened to, and a listening that means to be heard" [un vedereche

si fa guardare, e un guardareche mira al vedere ...
ascoltaree l'ascoltareche vuol farsi udire].

l'udire che si fa

In order to reduce the risk of stray or biased interpretation,
it is important that interpretation be sensitive to the question(s)
raised by the object or the work in question and that, moreover,
it organize itself in such a way as to be able to construct freely,
"developing and elaborating, opening up and revealing the interpretand itself" [sviluppandoe svolgendo,cioe interrogando,aprendoe
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rivelandol'interpretrando].Thus, without forgetting the personwho
does the interpreting, the person who, in giving account, is constantly trying to confer a meaning or portray a sense, we are also
attuned to the possibilities of constant figuration which the interpreting act elicits and thinking imagines.
Now this notion of interpretation as tightly connected to the
idea of personais more fully developed in Pareyson' s abovementioned later work entitled Verita e Interpretazione.Here we find
another crucial term, pensierorivelativo, which we can literally render as "revealing thought." According to Pareyson, the distinct
notions of saying, revealing and expressing coincide:
that the word is revealing is a sign of the validity of a thought
which is intrinsically speculative yet not oblivious to being, and
that the word is expressive is a sign of the historical concreteness
of a thought that has not forgotten time. (VI 23)

On the basis of the foregoing sketch of the basic tenets, it can
be intuited that the Italian philosopher is moving cautiously
among many of his contemporaries, but there is doubt that he is
here also staking out his own theoretical horizon. If historiographic
triangulations are at all useful, we can suppose that the way
Heidegger was reacting to the idealist strain in Husserl and the
Marburg neokantians, Pareyson was reacting to Croce and Gentile's idealism as well as to Banfi's transcendental phenomenology,
which had come on the Italian scene in the late twenties. 17
Pareyson seems to be introducing an ontological perspective
which is reconceptualized in terms of being and time in order to
supplant historicist thought (but I suspect also the notion of the
historicalin the strictly Enlightenment and then positivist sense),
a stance which is critical of instrumentalism, culturalism, biografism and all those historicist aporias which reduce everything
to the immanence of a given historical situation, or to an idealized
pragmaticism.
Yet a thinking which is also a revealing cannot circumvent
the issue as well as the reality of history and expression because
of truth no evidence can be adduced except through history,
through society, through the discourses made for or by history.
In this sense, in view of its being intrinsically "personal," interpretation must of necessity be also historically and linguistically understood. With these requirements, what counts is not reason,
but truth, because reason without truth yields the irrational, and
reason can be only either technical or historical. This subtle way
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of dealing with history may be worth pondering further: it is truth,
says the philosopher, that grounds [radica]reason, because:
anche gli aspetti piu 'teoretici' quali l'interesse puramente culturale
della storia delle idee o il rigore strettamente scientifico delle
ricerche metodologiche, non resistono a una radicalizzazione che
Ii spinge inevitabilmente all'esito irrazionalistico d'uno storicismo
integrale e d'un esplicito prassismo (VI 24)
[even the most 'theoretical' aspects such as the purely cultural
interests of the history of ideas or the strictly scientific rigor of
methodological research, cannot resist the radicalization that
pushes them inevitably toward the irrational consequences of an
integral historicism and an explicit praxism.]

Truth instead is equated with being. Being, says Pareyson, is not
a value, otherwise it would be subordinated to the values instituted by mankind, and would tend to classify itself as either lasting
or provisional. Rather,
L' essere non ha nessun motivo per preferire il durevole al momentaneo .... Il problemaedi riconoscerenellastoria la presenzadell'essere,
e quindi di distinguere in cio che e tutto egualmentestorico ed espressivo del proprio tempo: fra cio ch' e solamentestorico ed espressivo
e cio ch'e ancheontologico e rivelativo, fra cio la cui natura e il cui
valore si esauriscono nella storicita, e cio la cui storicita e apertura
e tramite dell' essere, e quindi sede della sua apparizione. (ibid. 42)
[Being has no particular reason to prefer what lasts to what is
momentary ....
The problemis to recognizethe presenceof being in
history, and, therefore, to distinguish in that which exists what is
equallyhistorical and expressive in one's time: between that which
is only historical and expressive, whose nature and whose value
are exhausted in historicity, and that whose historicity is disclosure
and medium of being and thus locus of its apparition. (first emphasis is mine)]

In short, no evidence of being can be given which is not at the
same time historically configured: being does-must-appear
in
history. The abovementioned notion of ontological inexhaustibility is now given body and contour: the interpreting person will
insist on both the co-presencing in time of a historical and revealing
act, as well as the experience of the open-ended discourse ever
in proximity to other possible "figural" formations.
In this context, another key notion in Pareyson's thought is
Tradition, which already in the 1954 Estetica was conceived as
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existing within the work of art. Tradition is crucial because it
supplies the plenum between the interpreter and the work within
which interpretation can be configured. The interpretand's position within this slippery, groundless, apparently elusive critical
horizon required, in the earlier book, that in approaching the
concrete work, the artifact, we had to be exposed to at least three
concerns: the school or current which nourished the work, its
living reality (its socio-historical instancing, we might say), and
"the original result of the working interpretation which the work
itself yields up" [il risultato originale dell'interpretazioneoperante
ch'essane da], which is to say the spontaneous claim made by the
work with respect to how it wishes (or exacts) to be understood. 18
Again we have an operative trilateral cognitive model which the
work elicits upon the interpreter's approaching it, disclosing an
enabling capacity, we might even say the agency to spur a dialogue
with whoever comes into contact with it.
It may be opportune to recall that this rooting of tradition in
the work itself is not peculiar to Pareyson' s work. In fact, it is not
foreign to literary hermeneutics as elaborated, in their different
ways, by both Gadamer and Peter Szondi, according to whom,
and with particular reference to biblical exegesis, the history of a
text is also the (hi)story of its interpretations. In particular,
Gadamer's notion of tradition as Ueberlieferung,or trans-mission,
is also not too distant conceptually from Pareyson's. It is significant, finally, that Gadamer and Pareyson both are behind (and
seem to come together in) Vattimo's notion of Verwindung,
wherein tradition is understood as a necessarily twisted and distorting appropriation of what precedes, never an overcoming, or

Ueberwindung.19
Yet there are traits which are specifically Pareyson' s and can
be very suggestive for future analyses, especially from what is
left of the left. Tradition is to be distinguished above all from the
notion of Revolution (today this is anachronistic, but, again, let's
not forget what were the "timely" issues in the wake of World
War II). Tradition, we learn, is the exact opposite of revolution,
not because it counterfoists to it some variant of conservation, but
because revolution means to start all over at the beginning, which
means its object is the past (an invented pure past projected into
an unlikely future), whereas tradition (and interpretation through,
indeed as, tra-dition) is the regeneration of an ontological necessity, it aims at recapturing the origin and its object is being. We
can infer that interpretation, and the notion of tradition it espouses, is, therefore, never utopistic, dreamy or nostalgic (in the
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sense in which these three words have something incoherent and
dismissable about them). Interpretation is, on the contrary, topical,
desired,at worst melancholic,though this latter only signals its being
sense-oriented (or "sensitive"), a type or way of knowing nevertheless-at best a work of art itself. 20
Before we make our way toward an overall retrospective picture of Pareyson's theory of interpretation, we must recall three
more points. First, that interpretation in its active verbal acceptation, as interpreting[interpretare],is always a transcending process.
Second, that the notion of originality-novelty
of the person and
of time, the "new" of the avant-gardes and Modernism, we might
add-is the same as the notion of being originary-as
derived
from the primordial ontological rapport, which is constitutively
"originating." Therefore, to be original is to be originary, and the
originary is always original. In a post-Derridian epoch, we can
see how this is important. And third, that
Interpretation is that form of knowledge which is at once and inseparably historical and truthful [veritativa],ontological and personal, revealing and expressive. (VI 53)
[l'interpretazione e quella forma della conoscenza che e insieme e
inseparabilmente veritativa e storica, ontologica e personale,
rivelativa ed espressiva.]

The implications of this for critics of art and culture: when
approaching a text, comprehension is possible only insofar as the
text reveals itself, but this revealing in turn needs the other (that
is, the interpreting persona) in order to be expressed: to listen
(look, sense) and to speak are inseparable: interpretation is not a
game of silence, but the speaking that issues from the silence that
enwraps the artwork. The fact that the revealing of the artifact
and the speaking of the interpreter go inextricably together or,
said otherwise, that interpretation is always a critique of something or other, brings us to yet another fine point in Pareyson's
thought, one that has sweeping consequences for the "practical"
aspect of criticism and commentary. When interpreting, says the
philosopher, we are not striving for analysis, but rather for synthesis. This may trigger an alert signal, for it does resonate with
similar idealist and historicist versions (like Croce's, for instanceand we don't need "impressionist" criticism-), yet it also beckons
to Heidegger's "hearing the call of the poetical." In fact, by
minimizing the obsessive preoccupation with objectivity-the interpreter does not, cannot, "objectify" him/herself, nor can the
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work of art itself ever be thought of as being only an "object"-it
also avoids the relativism of methodologism, as well as any arbitrariness and all skepticism. In this fashion, hermeneutics turns
away from the constraints and the aporias of epistemology and
is open to the possibilities of ontology, an eminently linguistic,
"narrative" perspective.
What is open to the interpreter are the historical concretions
of being as they manifest themselves in specific events and by
and large in cultural phenomena. What for many thinkers is
sought as the unity in variety or the multiplicity of truth is, according to Pareyson, a false dilemma, because these different formulations do not exist in history, as if they were contents dropped
into the abstract river of time; rather, they are history, so that each
interpretation of these problems is but a singular exegetical concretion, which is as plausible as, and not exclusive of, many others
that have actually come into being. The same can thus be said of
the many and varied interpretations of works of art. This is particularly evident in the case of artworks that necessarily dilate the
notion of interpretation, like drama and musical scores; these
artistic phenomena are in fact interpreted each and every time
they are performed [eseguiti]. The artwork does not disappear
amidst the multiplicity of interpretive reappraisals [esecuzioni],but
remains true to itself even in the act of disclosing its being to the
interpreter:
Le esecuzioni, al pari delle interpretazioni, sono sempre nuove,
non mirano ad essere uniche e esemplari e totalizzanti, ma parlano
a tutti nella maniera in cui ciascuno sa meglio intenderle. (VI 67)
[Much like interpretations, performances are always new; they do not
aim at being unique and exemplary and totalizing, rather, they speak
to all in the manner in which each one knows how to understand
them.]

This position, already elaborated in part in Estetica226-47, can be
compared with Benjamin's reflection on the reproducibility of the
work of art: the aura may be gone, but the problem of interpreting/
performing postmodern art forms persists, and with a different
agenda.
6. DEVELOPING THE CONSEQUENCES

We can see now that the interpreter is not a "subject" that
dissolves into the work, or, vice versa, that absorbs and dissolves
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the work in its interpreting act. The interpreter does not have to
"depersonalize" itself in a vain-and
unneeded---effort to be
"true" and "distanced" from the artwork. For the interpreter is
primarily a person,open and ever ready to disclose itself to other(s).
In tune with this premise, the work is never an "object" which
ought to be "represented" externally: the work is finally characterized by an intrinsic "unobjectifiability" [inoggettivibilita]which
derives from its needing to be activated, realized or performed
(in the sense of esecuzione, mise-en-scene)-and
reading dso,
according to Pareyson, is performing 21 -and which cannot be reduced to any one of its performances or realizations.
What this entails, in more broad hermeneutic terms, is an
authentic "overcoming of the subject" that in turns neutralizes
the subjectivistic attitude toward interpretation-which
is present
in both scientific and phenomenological thought-with
its tendency to universalize the impersonal and placing it as the foundation of thought itself. With the notion of person as derived from
Pareyson, on the other hand, we are co-involved in the irreducible
distance of the artwork, but at the same time we rely on its unique
and singular historical substance. And going against Kantian
claims of impersonality, the disclosure of the text is radicallypersonal, avoiding thus abstractions and theoretical relativisms of all
sorts. Before the artwork, we must listen,
because truth is not something that man invents or
that can be invented or produced in any fashion; one
be without pretending to invent it; and if the person
means of its revelation,this is above all in order to be
occurrence[sededel suo avvento]. (VI 84)22

produces, or
must let truth
becomes the

the locus of its

In sum, truth can issue solely from within one of its formulations,
"with which each time it identifies itself, and within which it
resides always as something inexhaustible." On the other side of
methodologism and its epistemological legitimations, interpretation aspires toward pure theory without ever becoming Theory,
and yet theoretical it must remain, that is, a contemplative discourse which inscribes situations and topics, and can therefore
serve as a principle of valid cultural transformations.
7. PROVISIONAL CONCLUSIONS

If we return to our initial frames of reference, we find that
Pareyson' s thought confirms and expands our hermeneutic
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model. To begin with, in terms of the theory-method relation, or
the equiprimordial, co-founding dialectic between method as
praxiological, instrumental means of knowledge gathering, and
theory as the rhetorical postulate of a world-view or legitimizing
ontology, Pareyson leans toward the latter without entirely dissociating himself from the former. That he emphasizes theory
above method is to be understood in part in terms of what was
then, right after World War II, a historical and contextual necessity
to realign scientific, rationalistic and phenomenological methods
of inquiry; yet it can be argued that, volens nolens, he himself
deploys a loosely adapted but no less rigorous phenomenology.
In effect, the path in between-the
meta-hodos-artwork and interpreter cannot even be described without a logoswhich is at the
same time (true to the several meanings that, etymologically, it
embodies) the revealing word and the temporally determined,
discoursive inscription of the interpreting act itself. Elaborating
on the metaphors suggested by the respective etymologies of
method (pathway between two or more loci) and theory (light in
the clearing, overall vision), then we can say that with Pareyson
interpretation entails no longer a formulaic and alienating relation
between theories and methods ready to hand, but a temporal-existential vicissitude of walking (toward) and seeing (while being
seen) at the same time the potential disclosure of the artwork (of
reality, in broad terms). The implications outside the here
thematized field of (literary and artistic) interpretation are that,
with his notions of forming-activity and person, Pareyson discloses the aesthetic to the ethic, and in the end the social, and
can thus lead us onward to a general theory of being in the world. 23
Concerning the second frame of reference sketched out at the
beginning of this paper-namely,
that there are at least ten conditions to be met for any interpretive discourse to be called hermeneutical-it
seems evident that with Pareyson we can really
speak of a hermeneutic experience as constitutive of the human
dimension in its totality: life is an endless shaping and forming,
and interpretation is the highest and most self-conscious, reflective
type of shaping (for both the artist and the critic). We can go
through each of the requirements of our makeshift decalogue and
find that, for Pareyson, interpretation is:
1. Intrinsically historical: being, truth and the work of art
itself are, as we saw above, essentially historical notions, even
though they may not be identified with history tout court, and
retain yet an ideal constitution.

PETER CARRAVETTA

233

2. Intrinsically linguistic: any formulation about an artifact
comes into being primarily as a linguistic formulation: listening
to the speaking of the revealing work means responding with a
theoretical-Le.,
"rhetorical" -formulation.
3. Dialectic: in its broadest, unthematized sense, there is no
doubt that the several interconnections that refer to one another
constantly require an enabling dialectic; moreover, the relation
between presence and the given, time and being, listening and
speaking are possible only as dialogue (we may think here of the
common etymon of dialectic and dialogue). These themes are
developed in Pareyson' s work on German idealism.
4. Ontologic: it is so by definition; as we saw during the
course of our exposition, to interpret means to engage in a continuous recalling and recovery of being as it manifested itself in historical concretions and in artworks in particular, each and every time
aspiring to an ever elusive fullness of being. The ontologic here
stands for the interface between what metaphysics has said being
is, as well as what it concealed in the transmission of the givenness
of untold concrete beings.
5. The work and the interpreter are together the site of the
occurrence of being: being is not created artificiously, demanding
rather that the interpreter/artist stay in wait "listening" until the
unconcealing "happens," "alights."
6. Objective: in the sense in which it is not "subjective" as
understood by our post-cartesian mind set; more than that, however, objective here stands for the recognition (against idealist
claims) that the artwork must "exist" in concreto, as a tangible,
verifiable "something" an artist (or anyone) has actually made or
produced.
7. Begins with the text: there's no idolatry of the text as we
have come to know it after Lacan and Derrida; rather, text is both
the entity and the metaphor for the actual artwork, and it includes
the canvas as well as the stage representation, the statue as well
as the manuscript. Much of this can be inferred from the long
section Pareyson devotes to "reading" in the Estetica.
8. Understands what is being said in light of the present: no
pseudo anti-metaphysics of "presence" here, for the present is
the historical actualitas of the interpreter. Interpretation is
grounded in the unrepeatable, irreplacable experience of the person, and the interpreting act comprehends primarily in view of
its present. Despite thematic, geographic and chronological distances, the interpreting act discloses the temporality of its being
as such-and-such in a precise given moment, which is the "time
of its occurrence."
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9. Broaching the boundaries of the distinguishable, interpretation is---cannot but be-truth,
critical, necessary, midway between theory and practice, recalcitrant to ideology, the string from
which pends the fate of existence and liberty.
10. It can be argued that Pareyson would want hermeneutics
to be subsumed to aesthetics, yet it cannot be denied that the
primacy placed on the person, on the act of interpreting and on
the necessity of the other (vis-a-vis the artwork) can also lead one
to see the two poles, aesthetics and hermeneutics, as the recto
and verso of the same inscription. Moreover, the fact that such a
premium value is placed upon the "forming ability" of all experience, may lend credence to the claim, made later by Gadamer,
that indeed aesthetics must be understood as simply one (though
privileged) dimension of the hermeneutic experience.
8. OTHER IMPLICATIONS

What are some practical consequences for literary theory?
Some suggestions are offered by the philosopher himself. The
problem of "content" is not essential-which is not to say it isn't
important. Rather, the critic should be aware that themes, subjects, arguments, and so on are subsumed to the more radical
question of style, which is an ontologically determining factor
insofar as it constitutes, in non-Pareysonian terms, the "signature"
of the artist. This points up to the rhetorical import of the concretization of the work, it being understood that rhetoric is not mere
tropology or stylistics, but the locus of linguistic occurrence, the
middle ground between langue and langage,the hermeneutic discipline of topics. 24 Pareyson writes that we can have art without
theme or content-accepting
the diverse manifestations of the
twentieth century-Le.,
the avant-gardes, which Croce, Lukacs
and others couldn't stand and wouldn't deign to remark on-but
there is no artwork qua artwork without a distinctive style.
A second important contribution which stems from this hermeneutic is that poeticsare extremely important. Here we should
open up a long digressive paragraph on the several meanings of
the word "poetics." Suffice it to say that poetics is something
different from what the structuralists have theorized over the past
quarter of a century or so. In this context, poetics correspond to
what artists say about art in general and their own work in particular. It should not be confused with aesthetics, which is normative
(E 311-13) and speculative (316-18). Poetics is programmatic, pragmatic, it aspires to a totality which is such only and exclusively
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for that one particular artist and often for the execution of one
particular work:
that the artist represent or transfigure, the essential thing is that
he "figures"; whether he deforms or transforms, the important
thing is that he "forms." It is necessary that art be informed by a
poetic which, in its concrete praxis, fuels it and upholds the formation of the work, but there is no one poetic more essential than
any other. (E 314)

Going against what Croce and Binni in Italy and Northrop Frye
in North America held on this issue (and thus implicitly siding,
on this argument, with both Anceschi's critical phenomenology
and Della Volpe's dialectical materialism), Pareyson believes that
an artist's poetic or poetics are crucial to the proper understanding
of a given work, if for no other reason than the fact that he/she
who makes (techne) the artifact, and lives through the creative
(poiein) process, is certainly capable of saying something about
what makes the "forming activity" construe a "forma formata," a
finished and shaped aesthetic product. Moreover, in view of his
general ontological plan, it makes sense to consider the artist the
first most original critic of him/herself: the critical-analytical moment interacts not when he/she is at rest (in which case the artist
is no different from the plain reader/viewer, and, as we saw above,
authorial "intentions" are meaningless), but during the process of
the making, while exercising and realizing all possible thoughts and
skills toward the accomplishment of the task.
Almost a direct consequence of this revalorization of the artist's "critical" input, in Pareyson's universe criticism coincides
with reading, but of a specific kind. Criticism, he writes,
is a kind of reading during which the aspect of judgment is accentuated; moreover, in order to guarantee the soundness of its evaluations, this reading aims at defining and subsuming a method, so
that the critic is ultimately methodologically conscious of his own
judgments. (EA 261)

Criticism, in short, is always both criticism-of-a-work, and criticism-of-itself, that is, metacriticism. In view also of what we saw
earlier in our excursus, we can posit a tripartite segmentation of
interpretation into-and
as-theoretical hermeneutics, poetics and
methodologicalcriticism. Moreover, we discover an exigency to account for the "included" middle (culled from his reinterpretation
of the Third Critique)as the kingpin around which the entire pro-
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cess rotates in intelligible equilibrium. Leaving aside for the moment the nature and structure of judgment, Pareyson immediately
adds that criticism should not "overtake" or "overcome" the work,
and ought to think of itself as simultaneously "reading and performance or representation" [lettura ed esecuzione].The third segment,
or the "methodological" or "judgmental" element, orients criticism
back to the first, or purely theoretical hermeneutics, coherently
with his position as described in the earlier parts of this paper.
We can sum up the "three moments" in a makeshift hermeneutic
circle:
(divining ante rem
experience/formativity in re
aesthetics post rem)
HERMENEUTICS

POETICS
(forming in re)

READING/CRITICISM
(formed post rem)

Finally, with reference to the above mentioned possibility of
interpretation as diaphoristics, which claims that interpreting is
akin to profounding oneself in the murky waters between poetry
and philosophy, Pareyson's position permits further voyages into
these uncharted seas. One question which could in fact be explored
with profit is the notion of Urgrund-as opposed to our more
familiar, Heidegger-inspired, notion of Abgrund. The latter has
yielded riveting results (especially in the investigations of Derrida), playing as it does on the missing half of the signifier which
in logocentric discourse is nevertheless bantered "as if" the signified were there. But what deconstruction cannot ever lead us
to explore (bther than to continually unmask) is the realm of the
sociohistorical archetype, which could be given renewed (nonstructuralist) vigor through the investigation of the ontological
Urgrund in figural and allegorical terms. Conversely, given that,
much like Heidegger, Pareyson also (albeit with a different ter-
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minology, in part inspired by Jaspers) frames the human dimension as essentially being "thrown into existence," in reason of
which man's most constitutive trait is then his "forming" drive,
the notion of an Urgrund could also be developed in terms of the
necessary "projecting" which both artists and interpreters do constantly. This would reverse the standpoint and lead to the study
of "prototypes" of all sorts, and conceivably can be useful in
aesthetics as well as in ethics and politics. The value to our
diaphoristic ideal is that, after (or at the same time as) the destruction of metaphysical, totalizing perspectives and constructs, the
interpreting being finds itself going through discourse formations-dia-Zogos-positing
each and every time-the phoric element-a possible inscription or de-piction (again, a temporally
proleptic, enframing futurity) which partakes of aesthesis as well
as of thought, of midday as well as midnight. But these conceptual
schemes will have to be developed elsewhere.

Notes
1. This is a chapter from my nearly complete book, provisionally titled
Thresholds;Italian LiteraryCriticismand Hermeneutics,1950-1985.The "Preface" to
this work has appeared in The ItalianJournal,Vol. II, N. 4 (1988): 36-42. Another
chapter, bearing the title "Repositioning Interpretive Discourse," has been published in Differentia 2 (Spring 1988): 83-126. The theoretical matrix is briefly
sketched out again in the second paragraph of the present essay.
2. Pareyson's thought can be approached from a number of different areas,
all of which inevitably reveal his often subterranean influence during the past
forty years. As the titles of his books alone indicate, he has studied German
Idealism, Existentialism, the critique of the Italian idealist and historicist
hegemony, and has written crucial theoretical works on aesthetics, interpretation
theory, and ethics . His Esteticais the starting point for the apparently unrelated
positions of the early Eco and Vattimo. For the relationship between interpretation and ethics, see Alberto Rosso's fine study.
3. Not to mention Plato and Aristotle, authors all studied in depth by
Gadamer throughout his career and protagonists in his masterpiece Truth and
Method.
4. Each of these conditions can be illustrated with a network of references
to Gadamer's work, but it would make the present essay too long. I have also
kept in view the studies on Gadamer's hermeneutics done by Bleicher, Vattimo,
Palmer, Ripanti, Weinsheimer.
5. I have developed this perspective in Carravetta 1990, which emphasizes
the challenge of the rhetoric of Nietzsche, and the problem of interpretation at
the interfaces bei.ween the Modern and the Postmodern epochs.
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6. Though we cannot get into extended details here, a reconsideration of
Pareyson's pre-Esteticawritings would be useful to reassess how much his notion
of personaowes to, and yet is a radicalizing of, German existentialism's emphasis
on the necessary, on repetition, and French existentialism's stress on the contingent, on choice. See Pareyson 1971:7-110. For his crucial distinction between
Heidegger's and Jaspers' notion of existenziell!existentiell,see 1971:207-58, besides
his book on Jaspers . The various versions of existentialism debated in Italy at
the onset of World War II can be assessed by looking at representative texts by
Banfi, Abbagnano, Preti, Paci and Pareyson published in Banfi's quarterly Studi
Filosofici,anno II (1941), now available in the 1972 Forni reprint, vol. I, 113-206.
For Croce's scathing reaction to this issue, see Critica, I (1942):48-49. For a balanced history and theory of Italian existentialism, see Santucci, who attributes
a major role to Pare yson. For Abbagnano, see his Critical Existentialism. For a
global reconstruction within the Italain panorama, especially vis-a-vis the
hegemonic idealist-historicist currents, see the different perspectives of Garin
and Semerari.
7. A case may be made for Emilio Betti's Teoriageneraledell'interpretazione
(1955), though its being almost exclusively a treatise on juridical interpretation
makes it less manageable in the realm of aesthetics and literary criticism. There
is little echo of Betti's influence outside of jurisprudence and legal history. Thereafter, however, no one, with the arguable exception of Brandi's Teoriagenerale
della critica (1974) and Eco's Semiotica(1975), has attempted to write a general,
omnicomprehensive theory of art and interpretation which invests the totality
of the human being.
8. The English rendition of these terms is necessarily provisional. It is hoped
that the awkwardness is offset by the need to distinguish in the pages that
follow among the various terms rooted in Forma which constellate Pareyson's
philosophy. From this point onward, I will use the following abbreviations in
my text: Estetica-E;Conversazionidi estetica-CE;L'esteticadi Kant-EK; Veritiie Interpretazione-VI;I problemidell'estetica-PE. All translations are my own .
9. See the explication in Rosso. In Croce, on the other hand, thought (or
thought which is logical, or philosophical) is fundamentally excluded from the
aesthetic act as pure intuition and expression . See his Aesthetic,ch. one. Similarly,
in Gertrude Stein, the search is for a rhythmic-expressive language mode which,
though yet a speaking, is totally devoid of any "content," rational or otherwise
(where content means or includes the referent). Recall, for example, her Stanzas
in Meditation. See the discussion in Carravetta 1985.
10. This aspect, which is revolutionary insofar as it simultaneously opens
to the "originary" characteristic of all works of art, as well as to its material and
pragmatic necessity, is also a basic potentiality for action and signification characteristic of all human beings . It comes very close to Polanyi' s heuristic imagination
and tacit knowing.
11. As Robert Innis once suggested during a conversation, there are some
interesting common points between Pareyson's aesthetics and Dewey's Art as
Experience.
12. It would be useful here to recall Pareyson' s extensive studies on German
idealism, in particular his readings of Schiller, Goethe and the late Schelling.
Cf. also his Conversazioniand the article "Lo stupore della ragione in Schelling,"
in Riconda et al., 137-80.
13. Vattimo 1986 critiques Pareyson for sympathizing too strongly with the
"theology" of Kierkegaard and Schelling, jeopardizing the project of secularization, as well as for leaving the issue of freedom open enough to mean or imply
a possible (if not emancipation, at least) reconciliation, which would betray a
Hegelian strain. In a way, the reservations expressed are directed to Pareyson's
failure at not bringing his perception of the absence of metaphysical foundation

PETER CARRAVETTA

239

more in line with Heidegger's "ontological difference" and Vattimo's own
"weakened being," which alone, Vattimo claims (1983), can now permit us to
ponder whether it is not high time we leave the "question of being" behind.
14. See in particular Esistenza e persona, 14 et infra.
15. This passage follows upon the first definition of interpretation we find
in the Estetica:"interpreting [interpretare]is such a form of knowledge for which,
on the one hand, receptivity and activity are indistinguishable, and, on the
other, the known is a form and the knower is a person. Without a doubt interpreting is knowing . . . since interpreting is gathering, capturing, grasping,
penetrating."
16. Besides Freud and Nietzsche, compare to some of the authors in bibliography. In this paper we can only allude to other areas of exploration.
17. Antonio Banfi's Principi di una teoria della ragione, which discusses in
great detail neokantianism, came out in 1927.
18. This allows Pareyson to sidestep simultaneously the issue of the intentional fallacy known to American Neocriticism, as well as the conundrums of
authorial intention which besieged modern hermeneutics from Schleiermacher
to Hirsch. Both become irrelevant; cf. E 276-77.
19. Though Vattimo is also constantly harking back to the more "radical"
Heidegger-the essay verwindung deals primarily with Heidegger-as well as to
the Benjamin of the "Theses on the Philosophy of History."
20. Pareyson has indeed implied that the "quarrel" between philosophy (as
thinking) and art (as creating) need not be and perhaps is not at all a contradiction,
an oxymoron, or a reciprocally exclusive dyad of forces where only one in the
end conceals the Truth. That has been the metaphysical illusion, the technocratic
desire, the rationalist fallacy, the demise of the Modern Epoch: to believe that
only philosophy could speak to the truth, that poetry just couldn't be trusted.
Pareyson certainly speaks favorably to this possible dialogue, and even attempts
to bridge the chasm between poetry and philosophy: "In the arts there's a diffuse
distrust of philosophy. They fear that the autonomy of art is compromised and
that art may disappear. They feel that the cold speculative rigor of philosophy
contrasts sharply with the emotional shudder of poetry. But this means ignoring
the character of philosophical thinking. There are in philosophy aspects which,
if adequately emphasized, make of philosophical meditation genuine and earnest
poetry, to the point that it becomes impossible to gauge the speculative value
without accounting for its reality as an art form. The search for and discussion
about truth, thinking as a personal experience, the liveliness of the imagination
which underlies philosophical thought: these are so many aspects of philosophy
which, if rendered evident, can confer upon it an artistic aspect. They might
even elect to consign reason to the essential [insostituibile,lit. unreplacable]
expression of poetry rather than to the precise utterances of reason. And then
there is the movement of the research becoming dramatic reality in Plato's
dialogues and in Pascal's notes; and there is the personal experience becoming
absolute identity of art and philosophy in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche; and there
is that same philosophical imagination reinless in the stylistic exuberance of
Giordano Bruno and Vico's balenare acutezza. Moreover, there's an art of
philosophizing, a formation-activity intrinsic to philosophy itself: to properly
exercise it means aiming for the essential expression, the functional aspect of
reasoning, the coherence of the system. So much so that some speculative rigor
turns into a literary work, and, in some cases, even a poetic reality .... Finally,
simply because some romanzi a tesi have failed, we are not authorized to say
that purpose [la tesi] kills art: in the hands of a great artist thinking [la tesi]
becomes art, because its very art is a theoretical construct [una tesi]." PE 47-49.
One cannot but think of Dante as a grand example of this. See also CE 169-79
on art and philosophy in Schelling.
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21. Consider the pages on reading in E 219-26, CE 41-48, and PE 189-231.
22. Compare the pages dedicated to the relationship between truth and
ideology in Veritii, Part II, 93--187.
23. This he does in part in his later works, especially the recently published
Being and Freedom(1986).
24. I have dealt with this topic at some length in my Prefacesto the Diaphora.
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